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Summary: The paper describes tests of hypotheses from economic history concerning the significance of finan-
cial development as a determinant of economic growth. It goes beyond the existing studies in drawing on a large
panel data set covering 93 countries from 1970-90 and includes a new proxy for the resource input into the finan-
cial system. Moreover, interaction effects between financial development and catching-up as well as education
are considered. Finally, to clarify causal relationships, a two-wave path model is estimated. It is shown that dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s finance was a significant and predominantly supply-leading determinant of growth.
1  Introduction
There are a priori four possibilities concerning the causal relationship between financial
development – broadly defined as an increase in the volume of financial services of banks and
other financial intermediaries as well as of financial transactions on capital markets – and
economic growth:
(1) Financial development and economic growth are not causally related. Neither of the
two has considerable effects on the other, and the observable (and empirically firmly estab-
lished) correlation between them is merely the result of a historical peculiarity: economies
grew, and so did their financial sectors, but the two followed their own logic. Modern eco-
nomic growth was governed by real factors, whereas financial development was rooted in the
history of financial institutions; a consequence perhaps of the Commercial Revolution of the
Middle Ages or of the Financial Revolution in 17th century. The development in other coun-
tries, on the other hand, was possibly an imitation of the Italian and British examples.
The above stated view follows implicitly from the neglect of institutional questions typi-
cal for many neo-classical economists (i.e. after the period of Classical Political Economy and
the German Historical School and before modern Institutionalism and the recent interest in the
ultimate determinants of growth).
(2) Financial development follows economic development. Economic growth causes fi-
nancial institutions to change and develop, and financial as well as credit markets to grow. Fi-
nancial development is thus demand-driven. As the growing scale of economic activities re-
quires more and more capital (liquid and fixed), institutional raising and pooling of funds for
industry are substituted for individual fortunes to start up enterprises, and for retained profits
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for economic expansion. The present diversity of financial systems stems from the fact that
various institutional arrangements can equally well fulfil the two basic functions of any finan-
cial system: bringing together savers and investors, and selecting the most appropriate uses for
investible funds. Moreover, the reasons for the choice of bank-based vs. capital market-based
financial systems are outside the scope of economics (e.g. historical, socio-psychological, ad-
ministrative).
This view is explicitly held by some modern institutionalists (and other believers in the
famous COASE-theorem), and explicitly or implicitly by many other economists.
(3) Financial development is a determinant of economic growth. The line of causation
runs from financial development to real development, where financial development, of course,
is only one among the many growth-inducing factors, some of them necessary, and some (or
some combination) of them sufficient. The logical distinction between a necessary and a suffi-
cient condition helps to clarify the difference between two distinct formulations of hypothesis
3 that can be found in the recent economic literature:
(3.1) Financial development is a precondition for economic growth. As can be shown
historically as well as on purely theoretical grounds, inadequate financial systems are major
impediments to economic growth. This view is held by most economic historians that have
investigated the financial development of the now developed countries, and by theoretical
economists, many of whose recent models give rationales for the assumption that well func-
tioning monetary and banking systems and capital markets may be crucial for economic
growth.
(3.2) Financial development actively promotes economic growth: provided that there are
no real impediments to economic development, sophisticated financial systems can generate
high and sustained rates of economic growth. Thus, this view attaches highest importance to
financial development. Its proponents generally refer to SCHUMPETER, but the ancestry is older
and can be traced back to SMITH and other classics. Contributors include distinguished
economists as well as some 'monetary cranks'.
The arguments vary, but Schumpeterian authors as well as some Neo-Keynesians usually
stress the banking system's ability to create money and channel it into productive and innova-
tive uses. Others claim that it is the information gathering and processing, which is accom-
plished by professional actors on credit and capital markets, that helps to improve the effi-
ciency of capital allocation.2
(4) Financial development is an impediment to economic growth. Here, as in hypothesis
3, the line of causation runs from financial development to real development, but the focus
lies on potentially destabilising effects of financial overtrading and crises rather than on the
smooth functioning of the financial system. This view conceives the financial system as inher-
ently unstable. While some theroreticians are ready to include commercial banks into the
sources of financial distress, most proponents direct their attention towards stock markets or
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international capital flows. This view is held by a wide range of economists ranging from
KEYNES (1936)3 to DIAMOND/DYBVIG (1983), SINGH (1997) and KRUGMAN (1998).
In connection with this, there is a lively debate about the wisdom of government inter-
vention in the credit and capital markets (financial repression vs. financial liberalisation). Ad-
herents to the financial repression school claim that administered (i.e. artificially low) interest
rates discourage financial savings and ration credit, thereby reducing investment and impeding
allocative efficiency. On the other hand, proponents of a state intervention into the credit and
capital markets argue that there are serious market failures which may result in crises and
crashes, a shortage of (high-risk) venture capital or other socially undesirable outcomes.
Unfortunately, there is no simple procedure to determine which view is empirically ade-
quate – not even one that would rule out some views as obviously false. First, the factors that
govern economic growth admittedly include many others besides financial development, and
interactions among them are likely to prevail. Second, mutual causation, which in economic
growth may be the rule rather than the exception, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to rule
out a specific hypothesis. Third, the existing data on financial development are plagued by
poor reliability and dubious validity.
Moreover, what might be an adequate financial system at one time or in one social, insti-
tutional and economic environment may be outright detrimental at another time or in other
environments. In other words: there may be various structural shifts or breaks which further
complicate identification of causal relationships.
Consequently, economic historians are able to give 'convincing' examples for all possi-
bilities of causality outlined above. Moreover, the existing econometric studies do not really
rule out any of the possibilities either, significant results can be cited for any of them. There
is, obviously, need for further research.
2  Some hypotheses from economic history
From HILDEBRAND (1864) to SOMBART (1916, 1927) to CHICK (1993) – among many oth-
ers – descriptive theories of the 'stages of financial development' have identified a sequence of
roughly three major stages. (1) A rudimentary deposit banking system, in which commercial
banks act merely as intermediaries between savers and investors, followed by (2) a more ad-
vanced money creating banking system, in which certain bank's liabilities are widely accepted
as means of payment, to (3) the present time, in which the financial sector is characterised by
a progressive securitisation of former bank credit relationships.
These generalisations from economic history offer a first, albeit valuable, insight into the
possible causal interrelations between financial and real development: The decisive change in
the macro-economic function of a financial sector obviously lies between the stages one and
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product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. The measure of success attained by Wall
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two. Deposit banking – widespread during the Commercial Revolution – certainly contributed
to a reduction in the transaction costs, thereby stimulating trade and manufacturing. Fractional
reserve banking, however, which came into being when bank's deposits established them-
selves as means of payment, allowed new investment through bank credit without prior sav-
ing. Hence, as has been observed by many economists, most notably by SCHMPETER (1911),
the banker together with the Schumpeterian entrepreneur can induce phases of a rapid indus-
trial growth and development.
Syntheses of theories of financial stages and the Schumpeterian credit-induced growth
hypothesis are given by GERSCHENKRON (1962) and PATRICK (1966).
GERSCHENKRON  points to the latecomer's (notably France's and Germany's) situation
which, in order to catch up with then far advanced Britain, had to mobilise massive amounts
of capital for real investment which gave room for an active development policy through a
state co-ordinated expansion of the national financial systems.
PATRICK, inferring from the Japanese industrialisation, introduced the now common ter-
mini supply-leading and demand-following finance. He suspected demand-following finance
to be the rule and supply-leading finance an exception, an exception, however, of major im-
portance, since it concerns the shift from stage one to stage two, which – according to
PATRICK – not only in Japan, but universally, coincides with the period of most rapid devel-
opment of industrialising economies.
Does economic history offer any lesson for the present? In what follows, I shall outline
why I think it does.
First, as PATRICK (1966), GOLDSMITH (1969, 1987), CAMERON ET AL. (1967), and others
have shown, in the now developed countries, modern financial systems generally evolved
during the very early stages of their industrialisation. Moreover, financial development – as
measured by GOLDSMITH'S financial interrelation ratio (conveniently proxied by M2/GDP)
generally levelled off after a few decades, reaching its fully developed stage4 by the beginning
of the twentieth century. These historical observations imply that in the process of industriali-
sation finance may have been supply-leading rather than demand-following.
Second, the traditional financial sectors of the present LDC's show similarities to those of
the DC's prior to their industrialisation. As many observers have noted (SHAW 1973,
MCKINNON 1973, FRY 1995 – to name just the most prominent), financial dualism is the rule
outside the developed part of the world. Enclaves of modern finance, mostly located in the
commercial centre, serve but a few export oriented firms, whereas the majority of economic
transactions takes place in the traditional sector which – leaving aside local peculiarities – is
basically functioning in the same way as it did in the now developed countries before their in-
dustrialisation. This observation implies that in the financially and economically less devel-
oped countries, there is a latent, but unexploited potential for growth.
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What may matter in this context is that the sunk capital and well as the professional skills
to operate a basic financial system providing a reliable means of payment as well as to ensure
smooth financial intermediation between surplus and deficit units need not be extraordinary
sophisticated and costly. Thus, unlike to other economic activities, the LDC's might be able
easily to exploit their growth potential by modernising their traditional financial sectors with
financial technology that can be easily imitated and borrowed from the more advanced coun-
tries (cf. CAMERON ET AL. 1967). While this hypothesis is not undisputed, it points to a possi-
ble positive interaction between a country's level of financial development and its catching-up
potential, which is rooted in the country's very backwardness.
Last but not least, economic historians have claimed that in the 19th century high literacy
rates in Scandinavia have led to a general "sophistication towards financial matters"
(SANDBERG 1978: 668). Thus, unlike other less literate countries (e.g. France or Southern and
South-eastern Europe) where financial development during the 19th century at times was far
ahead, the Nordic countries gained more from financial development (CAMERON 1993: 315).
This hypothesis about a positive interaction between literacy and financial development with
respect to economic growth – a new application of the so-called 'impoverished sophisticate'
hypothesis – could be important for an assessment of the macro-economic returns to financial
development in LDC's.
To summarise, the empirical material collected by economic historians suggests a number
of hypotheses that might likewise apply to the present economic conditions and should there-
fore be considered when investigating these topics in an econometric framework. Section 3
will address this question.
3  Empirical analysis
The objective of the following empirical cross-country analysis is to investigate – more
thoroughly than in previous cross-country studies – the asserted causal relationship from fi-
nancial development to economic growth, i.e. hypothesis 3, which – if found to be true –
would allow important policy recommendations. To this end, a three-stage research strategy
will be followed.
The first step (section 3.1) is to construct for a large sample of countries and various years
a new proxy for financial development (FD) which captures the share of resources a society
devotes to run its financial system at any given time. In contrast to the usual indicators of fi-
nancial repression/liberalisation and financial depth, which frequently suffer from ambiguity
(expressing monetary and credit volumes as well as financial overheating and likelihood of fi-
nancial crash), the FD-proxy suggested here relies on real inputs and stands for a well-defined
macro-economic concept. Therefore, it is possibly more adequate for investigations into the
sources of economic growth. Moreover, while monetary indicators like M2/GDP are very hard
to compare across time and space due to institutional diversity and change, our FD-proxy is
likely to be less sensitive to minor changes in institutional regulations, domestic and interna-
tional shocks and business cycles. Last but not least, since the shape and the scope of a finan-
cial system is firmly rooted in a country's history, this FD-proxy may be assumed to capture
very basic characteristics of an economy's structure. Consequently, the FD-variable suggested7
here is probably less endogenous to current economic activity than the traditional FD-
variables.
The second step (section 3.2) is to use the new FD-proxy in the by now well established
cross-country growth regression approach from the new empirical growth literature. Before
proceeding, however, it is important to recall the fact that finance is certainly only a minor
factor in economic growth – the fundamental determinants being the accumulation of the fac-
tors of production and technical progress. Consequently, to avoid serious mis-specification,
attention has to be devoted to an economically sound specification of the growth equation to
be estimated. Therefore, in contrast to many other studies, we shall use more right-hand vari-
ables than usual,5 and in addition we shall allow for interaction effects to capture two promi-
nent hypotheses put forward in the theoretical literature and cited above. Hence, contrary to
the prevailing approach that uses sample splits to examine structural relationships, the present
econometric model is less restricted from the very beginning.
The crucial problem with this approach is, of course, that in addition to requiring more
dregrees of freedom than usual, it depends on the collection of more data per observation,
thereby reducing the possible sample size. As a means to overcome this difficulty, all obser-
vations are pooled into a panel of 93 countries and four 5-year growth periods covering a time
period from 1970-90. Apart from dramatically increasing the sample size, this procedure en-
ables to allow for a priori unknown country and period specific ('fixed') effects using LSDV-
regression,6 which further reduces the ever present omitted variable bias, thereby giving more
confidence to the interpretation of the estimates for the coefficients of interest.
The third step of analysis (section 3.3) is to explore explicitly the causal structure be-
tween real and financial development. While in the still very much traditional estimation out-
lined above the question of causality is handled in the usual way (i.e. using lagged values of
the exogenous variables of interest), this procedure is far from satisfactory to reveal the causal
structure of the problem at hand.
Specifically, the traditional approach can do no more than evaluate whether the empirical
data contradict the assumption of causality running from exogenous to the endogenous vari-
ables; however, reverse and mutual causality (simultaneity) – possibilities which are crucial to
the present investigation – cannot be detected. To this end, we shall estimate a two-wave path
model with the FD-proxy on the one hand and per capita income (as a proxy for the level of
economic development) on the other.
3.1  A new proxy for financial development
The construction of the new variable FD for financial development is motivated by the
interest to get a reasonably reliable and comparable quantification of the share of resources a
society devotes to run its financial system.
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While this intention bears some resemblance to the core argument of transactions cost
and  institutionalist economics (NORTH 1990, WILLIMASON 1985), namely that aggregate
transaction costs are very far from negligible and that financial institution are a major re-
sponse to this problem, I depart from the closely connected evolutionist argument that pre-
vailing institutions – having survived the selection mechanism of the market – are the 'ade-
quate' solution. Instead, I regard the amount of resources devoted to run these institutions as
an indicator of the effort to keep transaction cost (as well as frictions and market failures due
to informational asymmetry that are mitigated by the financial system) low. In this view, a
higher share of resources for the financial system does not in the first place imply that the on-
going economic activities suffer from excessively high friction, but merely that from a macro-
economic perspective, the economy is devoting substantial means to keep these friction under
control.
This notion of financial development is thus very different from the common notion of fi-
nancial depth; it signifies a real rather than a monetary phenomenon.7 Hence, with this notion
of financial development, it is possible to address the question, how many resources should
optimally be channelled into financial services. I believe that the profession's standard formula
'until marginal costs equal marginal benefits' is useful also for this problem. Specifically, as
long as a positive contribution of the financial system (measured in operating costs) to output
can be detected in a macro-economic production function framework, it is reasonable to sus-
pect that marginal benefits still outweigh marginal costs.
The idea to measure the operating costs of a given financial system seems plain enough –
why has this not been tried before?8 I think a good part of the answer lies in the fact that no
international statistics supply reliable and readily comparable data. The three indicators which
I found suitable for consideration, (1) the share of manpower employed in the financial sys-
tem, (2) the share of the financial system in GDP and (3) the number of banks and branches
per capita,9 though distributed by distinguished institutions, are strikingly unreliable. Not only
do the numerous footnotes indicate that the reported numbers are neither comparable across
countries nor through time for a given country. Worse is that conceptual changes as well as
retrospective recalculations sometimes appear in subsequent volumes without any notice.
Moreover, missing values and obvious errors add to the trouble. Finally, these numbers have
to be transformed into the desired ratios (normalised to labour force or GDP, respectively) by
hand.
For a study of finance and development in a cross-sample of countries covering some
twenty or thirty years, all mentioned variables are thus very far from satisfactory. What fol-
lows, therefore, rests on the assumption that the raw numbers can be transformed in a way that
makes them reasonably reliable, complete and valid measures for the intended notion of 're-
                                                
7 I do not claim that the traditional notion of financial depth is not useful, but I believe that the degree of
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nomic functions: While the former inform about the prevailing channels of finance, the latter measure the
intensity of financial services.
8 At least, to the best of my knowledge, I know of no cross-country study that has attempted to do this.
9 For details and sources, see appendix.9
sources for finance'. The procedure chosen here is to identify the common variance of the
three indicators using principal component analysis. If the operating costs of the financial
system are reasonably well represented by the first principal component10 the individual
scores for this component may serve as a valid proxy for the interesting variable.11
Practically, to prepare the raw data, the three normalised indicator-variables (share of
manpower employed in the financial system, share of the financial system in GDP, number of
banks and branches per capita) were carefully screened for obvious errors and incompatibili-
ties. Next, the yearly values of the normalised variables were transformed into five-year aver-
ages for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990. Finally, operational rules had to be formulated
how to treat missing values.12 The remaining data for 93 countries and five points in time
were pooled and standardised. Then, principal component analysis was applied to the resulting
465 x 3 matrix, delivering a first component representing 77% of overall variance.13 Finally,
the individual scores for the first component were taken as our FD-proxy for further analysis.
We can thus proceed with a well-defined (µ=0, V=1)-variable that assigns a specific value
for financial development as defined here to all 93 countries in our sample through five points
in time.
3.2  Cross-country growth regression
The FD-proxy from the previous section will now be used as a right-hand variable in the
usual cross-country growth regression approach. Established as it may be, the list of compul-
sory right-hand variables and other specification issues are far form universally being agreed
upon amongst applicants or observers. It seems fair, however, to summarise that the standard
procedure in the 'new growth' literature is to refer to an 'augmented' aggregate production
function that relates GDP in country i at time t to the factors of production:




where Y is GDP, A a constant, K physical capital, L labour and H human capital. Assuming
constant returns to scale in K, L and H (D  +   ß   + J   = 1),14 i.e. the production inputs traded on
factor markets, dividing by L, and taking logarithms and time derivatives yields
                                                
10 That is, if the correlations between the desired representations are high, but measurement errors, stochastic
shocks have little common variance.
11 To come close to this goal, a 'technical' condition is that the indicator variables have to be measured inde-
pendently. This condition is satisfied here. Our three indicators for the size of the financial system are com-
piled from data published by ILO, UN and BANKER'S ALMANAC, respectively.
12 The general strategy was to estimate missing values in time by interpolation, extrapolation, trend analysis,
and – where possible – by regression on exogenous variables, but to exclude all observations, where the
majority of data would result from estimation rather than from original data.
13 The variances for second and third principal component are 17% and 6%; and all communalities exceed
67%, indicating that the expected one-dimensional structure of the three variables is reasonable well repre-
sented by the first component.
14 A pre-test for economies of scale in Y = A KD Lß HJ using the data to be employed in what follows (not re-
ported in detail for space considerations) shows that the null hypothesis D + ß + J = 1 cannot be rejected at10
g(Y/L) = gA + D g(K/L) + J g(H/L) ,
where gX stands for the continuous growth rate of a variable X and redundant subscripts are
suppressed. Starting from here, some further specifications are in order.
(1) In a growth context which allows for catching-up through international diffusion of
technology, for a given country i, human capital most likely enters the aggregate production
function not only as a factor of production, but also as a variable that may exert its influence
through changes in the level of technology and overall efficiency (cf. BENHABIB/SPIEGEL,
1994). In other words, the level of human capital has to be considered as a determinant of a
country's capacity to absorb technological and organisational knowledge from abroad as well
as a remedy to improve overall efficiency at home (these characteristics being represented by
Ait),15 and the same can be assumed of a wide variety of other socio-political and institutional
characteristics (BARRO 1991).
These different channels of causation can be modelled by assuming that the growth rate
of the overall efficiency level variable A is a function of a vector of n variables (X1, X2 ..., Xn)
including – among others – the initial gap to the technological frontier (Af0 – Ai0) and the ini-
tial level human of capital (H/L)i0. Thus, assuming a linear specification for g(A(.)) and sup-
pressing time subscripts
g(Y/L) = a0 + a1 (H/L)i + a2 (Af – Ai) + a3 X3 + .... + an Xn
+ D g(K/L) + J g(H/L) .
For empirical estimations in cross-country studies, Ai is usually proxied by initial (log)
per capita income (Y/L) and (H/L)i by a measure of (log) educational attainment (H/L).16
Since gA is certainly not governed by human capital and the technology lag alone, however,
the specification of X3 to Xn remains open to questions.
Here, we shall consider a proxy X3 = gT for technical progress proper, and – of course –
as the variable of primary interest the proxy X4 = FD for financial development. Last but not
least, following the hypotheses put forward in the literature and discussed in section 2, we
shall allow for two interaction effects by defining the variables X5 = FD ln (Y/L) and X6 = FD
ln (H/L).
Since we can draw on a panel data set of i = 93 countries and t = 4 growth periods, in-
stead of relying on OLS, we estimate the less restricted (fixed effects) LSDV-model which
allows individual constants for all i countries and t periods and is therefore a priori less likely
to suffer from mis-specification due to omitted variable biases than the simple OLS-model.
                                                                                                                                                        
any conventional level of significance; so that this assumption at least does not stand in obvious contrast
with our data.
15 For a broader discussion of overall (in)efficiency cf. LEIBENSTEIN (1989).
16 For a formal growth theoretical justification to include initial log per capita income Y/L and educational at-
tainment H/L relying on the assumption that countries are close to their steady states, see MANKIW ET AL.
(1992).11
Moreover, note that Af is constant across countries, it influences only the intercept and
can therefore be dropped without biasing the parameter estimates. Consequently, the equation
to be estimated is
g(Y/L)it = ß0i + ß0t + ß1 ln (Y/L)i,t–1 + ß2 ln (H/L)i,t–1 + ß3 g(T)i,t–1
+ ß4 FDi,t–1 + ß5 FDi,t–1 ln (Y/L)i,t–1 + ß6 FDi,t–1 ln (H/L)i,t–1
+ ß7 g(K/L)it + ß8 g(H/L)it + Hit .
Before proceeding to the results, a few remarks concerning the sample and the data are in
order.17
(1) The sample consists of all countries for which the necessary data could be collected,
with the exception of countries that are exceedingly small (population less than one million),
of countries with centrally planned economies through most of the period 1970-90, countries
in which oil exports accounted for more than 20% of GDP in 1985, and countries with war or
civil war claiming a death toll exceeding 2.5% of total population during 1970-88. The exclu-
sion of these countries is to acknowledge that it may make very little sense to run regressions
across countries which are fundamentally different from usual conditions (cf. HARBERGER
1998).
(2) The usual proxy for labour (L) in studies similar to ours is the size of the population.
While this may be adequate as long as the focus is on standard of living aspects of economic
development, we rather refer to the size of the labour force proper for our productivity ori-
ented study.
(3) Capital accumulation is frequently proxied by the investment rate. We choose to com-
pute capital stock estimates and growth rates instead. The reason is that we assume the well-
known problems of capital stock estimates (most of all the arbitrariness of assumptions re-
garding depreciation and obsolescence) to be more than outweighed by the provision of a
variable that is very much closer to the theoretical derivation of the long-run growth equation.
Specifically, investment rates are likely to change more than capital stock growth rates along
the business cycle and after macro-economic shocks. Moreover, having computed capital
stock estimates allows us to compute individual time series for v = K/Y, a result that will later
help to find estimates for capacity utilisation (see below).
(4) Human capital accumulation g(H/L) is frequently proxied be enrolment rates. Instead,
we compute the rate of change of educational attainment using data on mean years of school-
ing. In this way, we get a variable which is more reliable as well as closer to the model speci-
fication, thereby adding reliability and validity to our estimation as a whole. Apart from g(H/L),
in our model there are two other human capital-related regressors: ln (H/L) and ln (H/L) FD.
To stick as closely as possible to the literacy/financial development interaction-hypothesis, we
proxy the level of human capital by the literacy rate LIT.
(5) Technical progress gT is generally acknowledged to be one of the major determinants
of economic growth, yet, due to difficulties to find suitable proxies, it is very rarely explicitly
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modelled in empirical cross-country growth exercises. However, if the exogenous variable of
interest can be suspected to be closely related to technical progress – as in the present study -,
ignoring gT will almost certainly bias the estimates, thereby casting serious doubt on the ade-
quateness of the model. To avoid this kind of mis-specification, we again use a principal com-
ponent approach: Since no single variable from published statistics is likely to give an valid
estimate of technical progress, the procedure followed here is to consider a wide array of in-
formation from international statistics on R&D, patenting activity, scientific publications, and
direct acquisition of technical knowledge from abroad, and then to take the first principle
component of these variables as a proxy for gT.18
(6) Since this study is concerned with long-run characteristics, it is desirable to eliminate
business cycle and shock-related influences from our variables. To this end we correct our
production input variables K, L and H for capacity utilisation, drawing on a method frequently
used to determine capital utilisation in policy-oriented business cycle research. The basic idea
is that the empirical short-run fluctuations of the capital output ratio v are mainly due to cycli-
cal changes in capital utilisation. Accepting this line of reasoning, a long-run trend estimate of
v can be used to identify the actual deviation of v from its 'equilibrium' level, which in turn
allows to quantify capital utilisation. Labour utilisation would of course be adequately meas-
ured by the unemployment rate. However, it is hopeless to find reliable and comparable fig-
ures for unemployment for more than very few countries, so that for a large sample as ours,
one has to resort to less direct methods. Here, taking into consideration potential firm specific
qualifications of labour, the duration of work contracts and other institutional characteristics
of labour markets, we assume that labour is laid off to a lesser degree than capital is put idle.
To implement this argument, labour's capacity under-utilisation is computed as 50% of capi-
tal's deviation from its full utilisation. A similar procedure is applied to compute the capacity
utilisation of human capital. In this case, it is assumed, that human capital is 'hired and fired'
even less than 'raw' labour, assigning a value of 50% of labour's fluctuations in utilisation to
human capital's.
With the variables defined and computed as described above, the fixed effects model in
the pooled sample is calculated by regressing g(Y/L)it on its presumed determinants (with
growth rates computed as continuous yearly rates for every 5-year period, and level variables
taken from the beginning of the corresponding periods). This yields the following results:
                                                
18 The approach is similar to the FD-estimation procedure described above. For the gT-proxy six technology-
related indicators are reduced into one principal component. For further details, see appendix.13
--------------------------------------------------------------
g(Y/L) = ßi + ßt – .068** ln (Y/L) + .025* ln LIT
+ .025** gT + .155** FD –.015** FD ln (Y/L)
+ .036** FD ln LIT + .63** g(K/L) + .045* g(H/L)
--------------------------------------------------------------
N = 372,  R
2 = .86
one-tailed significance tests: ** p < .01, * p < .05
--------------------------------------------------------------
As a first comment, it is obviously justified to say that our model fares extraordinary well.
It explains 86% of the variance of g(Y/L), which is very high compared to the usual 70% in
similar exercises, and all coefficients are different from zero with their expected signs at the
1% or 5% level (the latter refering to the human capital variables ln LIT and g(H/L)). The good
overall fit is of course partly due to the inclusion of the country and period dummy variables
for specific 'fixed' effects (coefficients not reproduced here). Highly significant F-tests for the
joint significance of the dummy variables (F92/268 = 4.26 and F3/268 = 6.31) indeed certify the
appropriateness of their presence for both country and period fixed effects. Consequently, the
more restricted, albeit simpler, 'constant effects' OLS-model would suffer from mis-
specification.
Apart from that, the fact that all growth accounting variables as well the determinants of
overall efficiency are significantly partially correlated with economic growth adds further con-
fidence to our overall specification. Consequently, we interpret the estimated positive and
highly significant coefficient for the lagged FD-variable (t = 2,83) as a strong indication that
finance (as captured here) does indeed matter for economic growth an development.
Moreover, the significantly negative (t  =  –2,78) coefficient for the interaction term
FD ln (Y/L) suggests that the economically less developed countries gain more from financial
development than the more advanced countries, thereby giving new empirical support to the
PATRICK-hypothesis. Finally, the significantly positive (t = 2,51) coefficient for the interaction
term FD ln LIT is supporting the literacy/financial development interaction-hypothesis.
3.3  Causality
The preceding section can be interpreted as an exercise to evaluate whether the empirical
data contradict the assumption of causality running from finance to economic growth. To ad-
dress questions of reverse causation and simultaneity, however a different approach is re-
quired. To this end in this section, we present a path analysis with two variables, our FD-
proxy and per capita income Y/L, measured at t0 and t1. The model is conveniently repre-
sented in the following path diagram.14
FDto  ------------------------------------------->   FDt1
                                                          D0
                      ß1
                   D1
(Y/L)to------------------------------------------> (Y/L)t1
                                                           ß0
Hence, the model consists of the following two equations :
FDt1 = D0 FDt0 + D1 (Y/L)t0 + H,
(Y/L)t1 = ß
0 (Y/L)t0 + ß1 FDt0 + H.
Practically, the path coefficients are easily computed as the standardised partial correla-
tions resulting from regressions of the t1-variables on both t0-variables.
The (sequential) structure of causation reveals itself in the estimates parameters D 1 and
ß1. If neither of the two is significantly different from zero, there is no indication for causation
in either direction; if both are, the model indicates mutual (bi-directional) causation. Signifi-
cance for D1 only implies unidirectional causation from Y/L to FD, which is consistent with
the demand-following finance hypothesis, whereas significance for ß1 only implies unidirec-
tional causation from FD to Y/L, which is consistent with supply-leading finance as defined
by PATRICK.
Thus, contrary to the usual strategy to search for patterns of GRANGER-causality drawing
on time series of within individual countries, the present approach exploits inter-country
rather than intra-county variance, thereby probably allowing more general conclusions. As
with GRANGER-causality, however, a problem with this approach is the determination of the
lag. Since the model assumes causality to operate between t0 and t1, the lag is crucial. Hence,
for a strict statistical test, the proper lag length should be derived from theory and then be
specified a priori, before running the statistical test.
The general advice for two-wave models is that the lag should be 'long enough'. The  data
base allows lags to range from five to 20 years. Given the present state of our ignorance about
the finance-development-nexus, however, we choose not to determine a fixed lag, but rather
to run exploratory tests by trying out all possible lag lengths.15
With this qualifications of the nature of the following tests, we proceed to the results.
Since our interest is directed toward causality issues rather than the magnitudes of the path
coefficients, we report the significance levels for one-tailed tests of ß1 > 0 and D1 > 0, corre-
sponding to path 1 (supply-leading finance) and path 2 (demand-following finance), respec-
tively. Moreover, negative coefficients – not predicted by either of the two hypotheses – are
indicated.
--------------------------------------------------------------
t0 t1 path 1 path 2
--------------------------------------------------------------
1970 1975 ** *
1970 1980 * **









One-tailed significance (Ha: D1, b1 > 0) of path 1 and 2:
** p < .01, * p < .05
negative sign: —
--------------------------------------------------------------
An inspection of our results reveals that ß1 (path 1) is highly significant in 7 of ten cases,
and passes the 5%-test in an other case, while D1 (path 2) is significant at the 1% level only in
one case, and at the 5% level in tow other cases. Consequently, The general picture is that
though there are undoubtedly signs for mutual causation between finance and development,
significance is mainly found in the supply-leading finance-column, hence, the most obvious
line of causation is running from finance to development. Moreover, in no case do we find a
pattern of significance for path 2 only. Thus, while there is evidence for mutual causation, our
data do not give any indication for demand-following finance. These generalisation holds for
all time lags (from five to twenty years) that could be tested in our data panel set.
These findings of our two-wave path model obviously do not support the demand-
following finance hypothesis, and while the suspicion of mutual causation between finance
and development cannot be rejected, our results clearly indicate that supply-leading finance
prevailed.
However, some further qualifications are possible. Note first that the strongest signs of
mutual (instead of unidirectional) causation from finance to development are found in the
1970s. Moreover, for the second half of the 1970s, the estimates indicate a strong departure
from the usual quinquennial supply-leading pattern. If there is no severe measurement error in16
our data, the findings suggest that during this special period the level of financial activity was
detrimental rather than beneficial to economic growth (corresponding to hypothesis 4).
What follows is that the finance-growth nexus is not a stable relationship. Possibly, some
special circumstances in (such as the oil price shock induced turbulence in the international
financial system, the severity of financial repression, or the of radical financial liberalisation
induced by the MCKINNON/SHAW school) me be held responsible for the peculiar results in
the 1975-80 period, but more specific answers will require further substantial research.
Moreover, due to data availability, our framework presently does not allow statements
about the 1990s. Though more evidence on the stability of the finance-growth nexus may be
expected from new data allowing to conduct similar tests for the 1990-95 and following peri-
ods, with the data at hand, unfortunately, we cannot give any empirical evidence about possi-
ble shifts or reversals of causation that might be due to recent phenomena (globalisation of fi-
nancial markets, growing numbers of active stock markets as well as the recent financial cri-
ses, to name just a few).
4  Conclusion
The empirical results from sections 3.2 and 3.3 taken together suggest that the PATRICK-
hypothesis may indeed be an appropriate characterisation of the finance-growth nexus from
about 1970-90. First, finance obviously matters for growth. Second, it matters more in less
developed countries. Third, causation runs mainly from financial to real development with
only little evidence for mutual causation and no evidence at all for reverse causation (from
real to financial development). A further conclusion is that finance matters more in countries
with higher adult literacy.
However, our results indicate that the finance-growth nexus is not a stable relationship. It
did not operate during the second half of the 1970s; on the contrary, in this period financial
activity seems to have been detrimental to economic growth. At this time we can only specu-
late whether some special circumstances in the 1975-80 period (such as the oil price shock,
financial repression, or financial deregulation) are responsible for this finding. Hence, further
research should be conducted to investigate possible interactions beween the functioning of
the financial system and regulatory issues as well as the given economic situation from an in-
ternational perspective.
5  Appendix: data and sources
If not mentioned otherwise, data are from the PENN WORLD TABLES (Mark 5.6, revised De-
cember 1997).
Physical capital is estimated by the perpetual inventory method as specified for LDC's by
HARBERGER (1978) and refined by NEHRU/DHARESHWAR (1993), using a depreciation
rate of 10%.
Human capital (H/L) is taken from BARRO/LEE (1996) referring to mean years of schooling in
the male population age 15-65.
Capital (K), Human Capital (H) and Labour (L) are adjusted for capacity utilisation as de-
scribed in section 3.2 (6).17
The per capita growth rate g(Y/L) is taken as ß1 from [ln (Y/L)1990 – ln (Y/L)1970] / 20. Data
are adjusted RGDPCH from the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6). All other growth rates
are computed in the same way. The convergence variable is adjusted RGDPCH70.
Literacy Rates (LIT) are from various issues of the UNESCO STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, Paris.
Technical progress: Is computed as the fist principal component of six technology related in-
dicators covering the whole panel of 93 countries and five years (1970, 1975, ..., 1990).
Indicators and sources are from GRAFF (1995).
The number of Banks and branches are counted from the 1970 to 1990 editions of the
BANKERS' ALMANAC AND YEARBOOK, London: Thomas Skinner.
The share of labour employed in the financial system is taken from ILO YEARBOOK OF
LABOUR STATISTICS, Vols. 1971-1997, Geneva. The corresponding ISIC-2 ('international
standard industrial classification of all economic activities', 1968) classification is 'major
division 8' (financial institutions, insurance, real estate and business services)
The financial system's share of GDP is computed from various issues of the UN NATIONAL
ACCOUNT STATISTICS, New York, referring to 'finance, insurance and business services'.
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